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A PRAGMATIC CRITIQUE OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL 
THEORY: LESSONS FROM THE EXTREMITY 
 
James G. Stewart*  
 
 
 Corporate criminal liability is a controversial beast. To a large extent, 
the controversies surround three core questions: first, whether there is a 
basic conceptual justification for using a system of criminal justice 
constructed for individuals against inanimate entities like corporations; 
second, what value corporate criminal liability could have given co-
existent possibilities of civil redress against them; and third, whether 
corporate criminal liability has any added value over and above 
individual criminal responsibility of corporate officers. This article uses 
examples from the frontiers of international criminal justice to criticize all 
sides of these debates. In particular, I highlight the shortcomings of 
corporate criminal theory to date by examining the latent possibility of 
prosecuting corporate actors for the pillage of natural resources and for 
complicity through the supply of weapons. Throughout, the article draws 
on principles derived from philosophical and legal pragmatism to reveal a 
set of recurring analytical flaws in this literature. These include: a 
tendency to presuppose a perfect single jurisdiction that overlooks 
globalization, the blind projection of local theories of corporate criminal 
responsibility onto global corporate practices; and a perspective that 
sometimes seems insensitive to the plight of the many who have fallen 
victim to corporate crime in the developing world. To begin anew, we 
need to embrace a pragmatic theory of corporate criminal liability that is 
forced upon us in a world as complex, unequal, and dysfunctional as that 
we presently inhabit.  
  
                                                 
* Global Hauser Fellow, NYU Law. Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of 
British Columbia. My kind thanks to participants at the University of Toronto workshop 
on corporate criminal liability, and to Maureen Gillis for outstanding research assistance. 
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“When the formalist dream of finding invariant meanings 
underwritten by God or the structure of rationality is exploded, what 
remains is not dust and ashes but the solidity and plasticity of the 






 The history of corporate criminal liability is pragmatic. In the United 
States, the seminal decision authorizing the curious practice of holding 
corporations criminally responsible explicitly reasoned that disallowing 
the practice “would virtually take away the only means of effectually 
controlling the subject-matter and correcting the abuses aimed at.”2 
Corporate criminal liability was, in effect, a practical necessity given the 
absence of other viable forms of redress. The rapid uptake of corporate 
criminal liability in Europe several decades later was inspired by similar 
thinking. In calling European nations to embrace corporate criminal 
responsibility despite the anthropomorphism inherent in treating inanimate 
entities as having mental states, the Council of Europe argued that 
individual criminal liability of corporate officers left an unacceptable 
regulatory gap, which corporate criminal responsibility could fill.3 In both 
                                                 
1 Stanley Fish, Truth and Toilets: Pragmatism and the Practices of Life, in THE REVIVAL 
OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE 418, 419 
(Morris Dickstein ed., 1998). 
2 New York Central R. Co. v. United States., 212 U.S. 481, 496 (1909). See also 
Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an 
Observation, 60 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY 393, 421–422 (1982). 
(concluding that within Anglo-American systems, “recognition of corporate criminal 
accountability constituted a more effective response to problems created by corporate 
business activities than did existing private remedies.”). 
3 In 1988, the Council of Europe recommended that European states rapidly overcome 
their earlier misgivings with corporate criminal liability, on the bases of “the increasing 
number of criminal offences committed in the exercise of the activities of enterprises 
which cause considerable damage to both individuals and the community” and “the 
difficulty, rooted in the legal traditions of many European states, of rendering enterprises 
which are corporate bodies criminally liable.” See, Council of Europe, Recommendation 
no. R (88) 18 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States Concerning Liability of 
Enterprises Having Legal Personality for Offences Committed in the Exercise of Their 
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instances, the justifications for the concept were, first and foremost, highly 
pragmatic. 
 By no small coincidence, these events took place (in the United States 
at least) at almost precisely the same time as the advent of philosophical 
pragmatism. In 1907, only two years prior to the US Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision approving corporate criminal liability, William James 
published his celebrated philosophical text, Pragmatism.4 James was a 
gentleman. While he accepted credit for the label, he magnanimously 
conceded that the underlying theory originated with his friend Charles 
Peirce.5 The great philosopher John Dewey continued the burgeoning 
pragmatic philosophical tradition,6 before it fell into a long period of 
stasis, only to be resurrected by Richard Rorty some thirty years later.7 
While there is much variation within the school these philosophers 
initiated, they shared a distaste for what they describe as “philosophical 
escapism.” For the philosophical pragmatists, the rest of philosophy had 
become overly abstract, self-referential, and practically disengaged.  
 In the past decades, scholars have incorporated aspects of this 
philosophical tradition into legal theory, claiming to have developed a 
middle way between legal formalism and realism. A number of 
distinguished legal theorists have adopted some variant of legal 
pragmatism as a methodology,8 but none more prominent than Richard 
Posner.9 Initially an academic pioneer of law and economics then an 
appellate judge in the United States, Posner’s work on pragmatism sought 
to censure the tendency, in his view rife within the legal academy, to offer 
theories that amounted to little more than “highfalutin rhetoric of 
absolutes.”10 Instead of engaging with these absolute theories, Posner 
maintained that his iteration of legal pragmatism was normatively 
preferable. For Posner, his approach entailed “a disposition to base action 
                                                                                                                         
Activities (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 20 October 1988 at the 420th 
meeting of the Ministers' Deputies). 
4 WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM (1995). 
5 Charles S. Peirce, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, 12 POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY 286 
(1878); Charles S. Peirce, The Fixation of Belief, 12 POPULAR SCIENCE 1 (1877). 
6 See, in particular, JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE (2008). 
7 RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1981); For a beautiful 
discussion about the relationship between pragmatic philosophy and law, see Richard 
Rorty, Pragmatism and Law: A Response to David Luban, in THE REVIVAL OF 
PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE, supra note 1 at 
304. 
8 See in particular, JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A 
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY (2003). 
9 Posner’s most prominent text on pragmatism is RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, 
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2005). 
10 POSNER, supra note 9, at 12. 
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on facts and consequences rather than on conceptualisms, generalities, 
pieties, and slogans.”11  
 Strangely, though, legal pragmatism has not been harnessed to 
criticize corporate criminal theory, despite this concept’s unquestionable 
origins in highly pragmatic thinking and its remarkable coincidence with 
the rise of philosophical pragmatism. However, only legal pragmatism can 
offer anything approaching an adequate account of corporate criminal 
liability in its full complexity, which must account for the following 
variables: the application of corporate criminal liability to crimes that vary 
from tax evasion to genocide; corporate actors as diverse as gigantic 
multinationals enterprises whose revenues exceed those of most states and 
closely held family businesses; corporations operating uniquely within the 
borders of a single state and those engaged in transactions across the four 
corners of an increasingly globalized planet; and companies that are 
incorporated for profit as compared with others that pursue charity. What 
theory can account for the innumerable contingencies corporate criminal 
theory must navigate in these circumstances, other than a pragmatic theory 
that resists absolute claims?  
 Two examples from the frontiers of international criminal justice 
substantiate this point. The first involves corporate responsibility for the 
war crime of pillage, for illegally exploiting natural resources from 
modern conflict zones. Modern national courts not only enjoy jurisdiction 
over corporations who perpetrate this war crime,12 they can draw on a rich 
body of precedent to articulate the parameters of the offense as applied to 
corporations.13 For instance, at the end of the Second World War, a range 
of corporate officers from German businesses were prosecuted for 
pillaging natural resources like coal, iron and oil,14 all of which were 
exploited to fuel the Nazi apparatus. But since then, legally comparable 
commercial practices have led to little real accountability, despite the fact 
that illegal exploitation of natural resources from conflict zones has 
substituted for superpower sponsorship as a predominant means of 
                                                 
11 Id. at 3. 
12 For an overview of the law likely to govern corporate responsibility for pillaging 
natural resources from conflict zones, including the bases upon which many national 
courts can prosecute corporations for international crimes like pillage, see JAMES G. 
STEWART, CORPORATE WAR CRIMES: PROSECUTING PILLAGE OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
(2010). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. Walther Funk has convicted of pillage achieved through his role in the management 
of a commercial enterprise named the Continental Oil Company, which exploited crude 
oil throughout occupied Europe; Paul Pleiger, the manager of a company known by the 
acronym BHO, guilty of pillaging coal from mines located in Poland; convicting 
businessman Hermann Roechling for pillage after he seized and exploited steel plants at 
Moselle and Meurthe-et-Moselle that yielded 9 million tons of liquid steel per annum.  
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conflict financing since the end of the Cold War.15 Coupling corporate 
criminal liability, the war crime of pillage and the jurisdiction of domestic 
courts over these crimes offers a new means of ending this impunity, 
which is very much in keeping with the pragmatic origins of corporate 
criminal liability as a concept. 
 The second illustration looks to the arms industry. Advocates suggest 
that over 2,000 civilians die each week from weapons-related injuries, 
many at the hands of notoriously brutal regimes that acquired this 
weaponry from corporations.16 I argue that under certain circumstances, 
corporations that manufacturer, sell and distribute weaponry become 
complicit in the international crimes their commerce enables.17 To draw 
again on illustrations from practice, corporate officers were prosecuted for 
selling the chemicals used to asphyxiate civilians at Auschwitz after 
WWII,18 and modern courts have also begun to prosecute individual arms 
vendors for complicity in international crimes for knowingly transferring 
weapons to recipients who use them to perpetrate atrocities.19 While these 
precedents are presently focused on corporate officers as individuals, a 
turn to corporations is imminent. In good pragmatic tradition, this shift is 
likely to appeal given the paucity of other viable avenues for redress. 
 What then are the key tenets of legal pragmatism, and how do these 
examples from the forefront of international criminal justice help 
                                                 
15 PHILIPPE LE BILLON, WARS OF PLUNDER: CONFLICTS, PROFITS AND THE POLITICS OF 
RESOURCES (2012); NATURAL RESOURCES AND VIOLENT CONFLICT: OPTIONS AND 
ACTIONS, (Ian Bannon & Paul Collier eds., 2003); MICHAEL KLARE, RESOURCE WARS: 
THE NEW LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL CONFLICT (2002). 
16 ANDREW FEINSTEIN, THE SHADOW WORLD: INSIDE THE GLOBAL ARMS TRADE (2011); 
LORA LUMPE, RUNNING GUNS: THE GLOBAL BLACK MARKET IN SMALL ARMS (2000); 
RACHEL STOHL & SUZETTE GRILLOT, THE INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRADE (2009). 
17 I concede that this point is not beyond dispute as a matter of criminal theory. See R A 
Duff, “Can I Help You?” Accessorial Liability and the Intention to Assist, 10 LEGAL 
STUDIES 165 (1990) (arguing that using complicity in the ordinary course of business is 
structurally akin to omission liability since it requires the businessperson to break with 
their usual course of conduct).  For different views that use arms vendors as examples of 
accessorial liability, see John Gardner, Complicity and Causality, 1 CRIM. LAW AND 
PHILOS. 127 (2007); CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A 
COLLECTIVE AGE (2000). 
18 Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (The Zyklon B Case), British Military Court, 
Hamburg, 1 Law Report of Trials of War Criminals, 93 (March 8, 1946). 
19 Prosecutor v. Van Anraat, Netherlands, LJN: BA6734, Gerechtshof ‘s-Gravenhage , 
2200050906-2, (May 9, 2007) (charging Frans Van Anraat with complicity in genocide 
and war crimes for selling chemical weapons to Saddam Hussein, that were ultimately 
used to gas civilians); Prosecutor v. Kouwenhoven, Netherlands, LJN: AY5160, 
Rechtbank ‘s-Gravenhage , 09/750001-05 (July 28, 2006) (charging Guus Kouwenhoven 
with complicity in international crimes perpetrated by Charles Taylor’s regime in 
Liberia). 
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demonstrate its necessity in corporate criminal theory? To begin, note that 
there is little agreement among self-styled pragmatists about the content of 
their method, which requires that I pick and choose certain themes to 
inform this critique.20 In so doing, I neither concur with the controversial 
conclusions some pragmatisms reach,21 nor defend pragmatism against its 
many detractors.22 Instead, I use five central themes distilled from 
philosophical and legal pragmatism in order to highlight significant 
structural flaws in thinking about corporate crime. In many respects, 
examples from international criminal justice suit these purposes ideally; 
their extreme nature allows us to test the integrity of categorical models 
from the periphery rather than the core, and the highly transnational 
character of the underlying transactions upsets the state-centric thinking 
that animates many existing accounts of corporate criminal liability. Let 
me proceed, then, to introduce the five pragmatic themes. 
 First, pragmatism rejects abstract theories that are absolute in 
formulation. In its philosophical guise, this arises from an anti-
foundationalist view of epistemology, which denies that there are 
fundamental and indubitable truths. As John Dewey explains, when a 
theory is “[n]ot tested by being employed to see what it leads to in 
ordinary experience and what new meanings it contributes, this subject-
matter becomes arbitrary, aloof—what is called ‘abstract’ when that word 
is used in a bad sense to designate something which exclusively occupies 
a realm of its own without contact with the things of ordinary 
experience.”23 Once incorporated into legal theory, this idea clashes with 
formalism—the notion that abstract concepts rationally applied 
mechanically produce specific answers in concrete cases.24 By contrast, 
pragmatists distrust “pretensions of totalizing Big Think theories to 
                                                 
20  To some extent, many scholars consider that legal pragmatism can stand apart from its 
predecessor philosophical pragmatism, but I choose to draw from both traditions. 
Thomas C. Grey, Freestanding Legal Pragmatism, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: 
NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE, supra note 1, at 254. 
21  I am opposed, for instance, to Posner’s reasoning about the role of pragmatism in the 
war on terror. See POSNER, supra note 9. 
22 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 150–153 (1986); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC 
SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY: PRAGMATISM AND A SOCIAL THEORY OF LAW 26–57 (1999); 
David Luban, What’s Pragmatic about Legal Pragmatism?, in THE REVIVAL OF 
PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE, supra note 1.  
23 DEWEY, supra note 6, at 6. 
24 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY: PRAGMATISM AND A SOCIAL 
THEORY OF LAW 35 (1999) (discussing formalism within the context of pragmatism more 
broadly). 
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capture all that is important in law.”25 And yet, as we will soon see, 
existing theories of corporate criminal liability are almost invariably 
couched in absolutist terms, in ways pragmatism is so keen to expose as 
either fallacious or meaningless. 
 Second, pragmatism evaluates the merit of a theory in purely 
instrumental terms. In the earliest stages of this critical philosophy, 
William James famously announced that pragmatism “has no particular 
results. It has no dogmas, and no doctrines save its method.”26 The 
quintessence of the method he imagined was to dispassionately ascertain 
whether a given theory was “good for anything.”27 To return to Dewey, 
the acid test of any philosophical concept is: “[d]oes it end in conclusions 
which, when they are referred back to ordinary life-experiences and their 
predicaments, render them more significant, more luminous to us, and 
make our dealings with them more fruitful.”28  Alas, I fear that the answer 
to this question for much of current corporate criminal theory is no, and 
that cases at the brink of international criminal justice help expose this 
reality most clearly. 
 Third, pragmatists undertake their assessment of theories with great 
sensitivity to context. In keeping with the understanding that truth is 
dynamic, not eternal, many pragmatists look to realities within particular 
historical and cultural contexts to gauge the merit of conceptual models.29 
In the legal realm, Thomas Grey eloquently argues that “[p]ragmatists 
remind lawyers that their activities are complex and multifarious, and 
unlikely to be completely accounted for by any single theory, however 
compelling its application in any particular context.”30 Despite this 
warning, much of the literature offering theoretical accounts of corporate 
criminal liability is universal in conception but informed by only a single 
context. Corporate responsibility for tax fraud in Delaware need not hold 
to the same conceptual principles as corporate war crimes in Iraq, the 
Congo or East Timor, but theorists often gloss over these nuances, 
offering accounts that presume one-size-fits-all. 
                                                 
25 David Luban, What’s Pragmatic about Legal Pragmatism?, in THE REVIVAL OF 
PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE, supra note 1, at 
275.  
26 JAMES, supra note 4, at 47. 
27 Grey, supra note 20, at 265. (Pragmatists ask, in assessing theories, what good they are 
for anything"). 
28 DEWEY, supra note 6, at 9–10. 
29 POSNER, supra note 9, at 52. (“pragmatists justify their recommendations contextually. 
They see the quest for livable ethical principles as arising from concrete practices and 
predicaments, situated in particular historical and cultural contexts.”) 
30 Grey, supra note 20, at 266. 
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 Beneath this commitment to assessing theories in context lies an 
associated concern about perspective. Because truth is contingent rather 
than universal, the perspective of those offering theoretical explanations 
colors the validity of their conceptual models. In addressing this point, 
Martha Minow and Elizabeth Spelman emphasize “how apparently neutral 
and universal rules in effect burden or exclude anyone who does not share 
the characteristics of privileged, white, Christian, able-bodied, 
heterosexual, adult men for whom those rules were actually written.”31 
Even if some of these biases are less obvious in the context of corporate 
criminal theory, many commentators do assume a single perfect 
jurisdiction, which plays down widespread corporate crimes in the Global 
South, and in the case of international crimes in particular, their terrible 
continuity with colonialism and slavery. Asking how to best achieve 
justice for corporate crimes in these contexts inserts a new perspective that 
immediately disrupts the discourse. 
 Fourth, and relatedly, pragmatisms are weary of universalizing local 
experience. In a world where truth is malleable and dynamic, conceptual 
principles that are valid within one community are not immediately 
transposable across all manifestations of the phenomena. As Dewey puts 
it, we should resist the temptation to “transform purely immediate 
qualities of local things into generic relationships.”32 This proposition 
perhaps warrants no real emphasis in an age that has finally begun to 
embrace legal pluralism, and yet in some instances, corporate criminal 
theory still contravenes this principle by adopting a parochial 
understanding of the concept even though others exist elsewhere and by 
overlooking that many corporations are operating in contexts that are not 
local, i.e., in countries foreign to theorists. At points, this tendency in 
corporate criminal theory is so pronounced that it risks substantiating 
Richard Posner’s concern that “[o]ur minds race ahead of themselves… 
inclining us to universalize our local, limited insights.”33 
 Fifth, pragmatism is committed to experimentation. As a philosophical 
principle, pragmatism “is eclectic, a thing of compromises, that seeks a 
modus vivendi above all things.”34 This implies a desire for rigorous 
conceptual explanations, but ones that are consistent with practice rather 
than pure abstractions in the sense pejorative to pragmatisms. So, contrary 
to Posner’s appreciation of the concept, pragmatism does not eschew 
moral theorizing or its relevance to law; it recommends instead that each 
                                                 
31 Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597, 1601 
(1989). 
32 DEWEY, supra note 6, at 128–129. 
33 POSNER, supra note 9, at 5. 
34 JAMES, supra note 4, at 25. 
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and every conceptual ideal is tested in the laboratory of real-world 
experience.35 On a superficial level, all of our attempts to regulate the 
might of corporate power follow this model, from the advent of corporate 
criminal liability to the Alien Tort Claims Act and beyond. The challenge 
is for theoretical understandings to catch up with these ongoing acts of 
experimentation, which will soon move into a new international phase. In 
a world as complex and dysfunctional as that we inhabit, experimentation 
like this is a necessity. 
 Finally, let me qualify the foregoing and situate these principles within 
criticisms of pragmatism. On the one hand, I remain agnostic about 
pragmatism as an interpretative technique, and I certainly see enormous 
value in an ongoing engagement between philosophy and law. I am also 
almost entirely on board with Henry Smith’s thoughtful argument that 
“[l]egal pragmatism is best understood as a kind of exhortation about 
theorizing; its function is not to say things that lawyers and judges do not 
know, but rather to remind lawyers and judges of what they already 
believe but often fail to practice.”36 While most of the key tenets of 
pragmatism are just basic measures of any defensible theory, there is still 
something unique to the pragmatic method in an area such as corporate 
criminal theory, where the contingencies are immense and cannot be 
known ahead of time. In essence, at least here, pragmatism has unique 
value. Thus, we should embrace a pragmatic theory of corporate criminal 
liability that circumstance forces upon us. 
 My argument elaborating on these views proceeds in three phases. 
Having set out basic themes of legal pragmatism that I use as benchmarks 
throughout the remainder of this article, Part II addresses both sides of the 
arguments for and against corporate criminal liability as a concept. Those 
who argue that we need corporate criminal liability may be correct as a 
generic policy, but their arguments cannot be universalized for every 
iteration of corporate offending. Likewise, attempts to account for the 
guilt of corporations in retributive terms are, sometimes by their own 
admission, contingent in ways that often pass unnoticed. Part III then 
employs the same methodology to criticize debates about the relative 
merit of corporate criminal liability as compared with corporate civil 
liability. Here, we witness violations of all principles pragmatists revere: 
local experience universalized without regard to context, perspective or 
heterogeneity in the real world. Part IV continues the pragmatic critique 
by highlighting how many of the arguments for corporate criminal liability 
over and above individual liability of corporate officers do not 
                                                 
35 Michael Sullivan & Daniel J. Solove, Can Pragmatism Be Radical? Richard Posner 
and Legal Pragmatism, 113 YALE L.J. 687, 708 (2003). 
36 Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 411 (1990). 
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automatically apply to international crimes. I conclude by arguing that in 
order to make sense of all this, we require a entirely new pragmatic model 
that grapples with the many hidden variables, appreciates the vast array of 
applicable laws as best possible, and develops conceptual priorities that 
operate on a provisional not fixed basis.  
  
II. JUSTIFICATIONS OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
 
 Corporate criminal liability is a controversial creature. To essentialize 
the competing arguments, the debate is between those who argue we need 
corporate criminal liability and others who complain that it jeopardizes the 
criminal law’s exclusively individualistic focus, thereby endangering the 
discipline and society. Indeed, when puzzling over the curious practice of 
blaming inanimate entities, many doubt “the justice and wisdom of 
imposing a stigma of moral blame in the absence of blameworthiness in 
the actor.”37 In this section, I criticize both sides of this debate, arguing 
that much of this discourse has fallen into the unconvincing habit of over-
generalization, in ways that contravene almost all of the tenets pragmatists 
hold dear. Once we correct for these structural flaws, as the advent of 
corporate responsibility for international crimes will demand, we begin to 
observe the highly contingent character of arguments for and against 
corporate criminal liability. This, in turn, should lead inexorably to the 
triumph of a pragmatic, not absolute, explanation of the concept.  
A. The Occasionally Overstated Need for Corporate Criminal Liability 
 
If one were to reduce consequentialist accounts of corporate 
criminal liability to a slogan, it might be this: one legal fiction deserves 
another. The decision to grant corporations personhood was the original 
conceptual evil, so having endorsed this initial untruth, we should at least 
follow the fiction through to its logical conclusion. Otherwise, if we 
tolerate the half measure, corporations are assigned all the normal human 
propensity for causing harm, but no possibility of being called to account 
before one of society’s strongest means of expressing moral 
condemnation. Put differently, to entertain the magical thinking that 
corporations are people to the tremendous benefit of these entities, then to 
slam the door on arguments that they should be held responsible like 
                                                 
37Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing 
Economic Regulations, 30 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 422, 422 (1963). 
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people seems badly lop-sided. In the name of consistency, we need 
corporate criminal liability to balance the conceptual scales; we need a 
second lie to counterbalance the first. 
But on closer inspection, the idea of pursuing the fallacy to its 
logical ends invites dangerous floodgates arguments in two directions. In 
the first, does this commitment mean that we could also have a 
corporation as President of the United States? In the second, would the 
theory of moral agency this would entail also mean that states, rebel 
groups, international organizations and the Holy See could be held 
criminally responsible? If not, why? Without clear philosophical 
parameters preventing this multi-directional slippage, the argument for 
complete embrace of corporate personality seems too absolute, in ways 
pragmatists rightly reject. Legislatures and courts do not adopt corporate 
criminal liability because of its philosophical coherence within the 
surrounding legal system, they do so out of a very pragmatic concern that 
there is no other meaningful option. 
It is not difficult to sympathize with the anxiety that feeds this 
posture—evidence of corporate power makes for staggering reading. Of 
the 100 largest economies in the world, 51 are corporations,38 and the 
revenues of just General Motors and Ford “exceed the combined GDP for 
all of sub-Saharan Africa.”39 To draw on one sector that is especially 
relevant to our present inquiry, the top 100 companies involved in the 
production and marketing of arms and ammunition reportedly posted a 
60% increase in profit between the years 2000 and 2004 alone. And yet 
already, the intuition that corporate might necessitates corporate criminal 
liability reveals an argument whose boundaries are ill-defined and a one-
size-fits-all approach that need not coincide with every instance of 
corporate criminality. True, many international crimes are occasioned by 
the actions of these leviathans, but some are also carried out by their 
miniscule siblings.  
The extractive industry, for instance, habitually relies on much 
smaller risk-embracing “juniors” to operate in conflict zones in order to 
acquire cheaper access to precious metals such as coltan, cassiterite, gold 
and wolframite. These “juniors” tend to be closely held companies, some 
of which are just shells specifically created for single high-risk 
commercial speculation carried out by individual businesspeople. In 
certain circumstances, there is evidence to suggest that some of these 
companies have been instrumental in determining the course of major 
international armed conflicts, installing new governments by signing 
lucrative extractive contracts with rebel groups en pleine guerre. And yet, 
                                                 
38SARAH ANDERSON, TOP 200: THE RISE OF CORPORATE GLOBAL POWER 1 (2008). 
39JOSHUA KARLINER, THE CORPORATE PLANET 5 (1997). 
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if any of these companies are ever criminally prosecuted, the size and 
strength of multinational corporations globally will provide no 
justification for the practice. 
Perhaps deterrence is the better rationale? Indeed, many argue that 
corporations may be more rational than individuals, thus allowing the 
criminal law to better stymie future offending. As Brent Fisse has cogently 
argued, the reality with criminal law in its individualistic orientation is 
that society expresses condemnation in a way that ostracizes the people 
who perpetrate crimes, exacerbating rather than correcting the social 
deviance that led to the offending.40 By contrast, “corporations are more 
likely to react positively to criminal stigma by attempting to repair their 
images and regain public confidence.”41 Despite the inherent difficulty of 
measuring deterrence, there is stimulating literature that suggests 
corporations may be more deterrable than individuals in certain 
circumstances.42 If this is true, corporate criminal liability offers very new 
opportunities for deterring crime,43 which tends to remain under-
appreciated in the literature on deterrence of atrocity, which is almost 
exclusively oriented towards individuals alone. 
Let me expand. To date, much of the literature on deterrence of 
atrocity has focused uniquely on the social foment necessary to generate 
mass violence, pointing out that any rational incentive generated by 
criminal law is unlikely to restrain the fierce passion required to perpetrate 
offences of this barbarity, particularly when the probability of prosecution 
is so low.44 And yet, this assumes that only individuals are guilty of 
international crimes. On the contrary, corporations pursuing profit rather 
                                                 
40 Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, 
and Sanctions, 56 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 1141, 1164 (1983). 
41 Id. at 1153–1154. In the same vein, Walsh & Pyrich note that corporate criminal 
convictions can strongly impact consumer purchasing decisions, and that criminal 
conviction may have other effects such as barring a corporation from certain kinds of 
business activity. Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as 
a Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS LAW 
REVIEW 605, 635 (1995).   
42 SALLY S. SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 36 (2002).  
43 In fairness, not everyone shares this view. For example, though Eli Lederman is open 
to considering “self-identity” models of corporate criminal liability, he views individual 
liability as a more compelling and efficient deterrent. Eli Lederman, Models for Imposing 
Corporate Criminal Liability: From Adaptation and Imitation Toward Aggregation and 
the Search for Self-Identity, 4 BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW 641, 702 (2000). 
44 Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future 
Atrocities? 95 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 7, 10 (2001); David 
Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice, 23 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 473, 474 (1999); Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal 
Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777, 832 
(2006).  
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than inter-ethnic rivalries also satisfy the formal elements of international 
crimes. And importantly, the corporations that sustain bloodshed are more 
exposed to foreign law enforcement, more prone to rational deliberation 
through their commitment to profit-maximization, and likely to perceive 
conviction for a war crime as nothing short of a commercial catastrophe. 
Thus, there is reason for some jubilation at this promising new stratagem 
for inhibiting mass violence, even if it remains latent at present. 
To placate the pragmatists, though, we should still qualify our 
enthusiasm. For one reason, some companies are very much part and 
parcel of a genocidal apparatus, undermining the arguments that 
corporations are more prone to general or specific deterrence than those 
who fiercely swing the machetes. During WWII, the Nazi regime created 
all range of companies to implement their terrifying expansionist 
agenda,45 but a more modern example better illustrates the point. During 
the Rwandan genocide, calls to butchery were constantly issued and co-
ordinated by the infamous Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines 
(RTLM).46 These acts constitute corporate crime par excellence, even if 
they were never tried as such. Only here, the corporate officers were every 
bit as “impassioned” as those who obediently responded to their 
instigations. Consequently, deterrence may well be illusory here, for 
reasons many excellent scholars of international criminal justice point 
out.47 The overarching point, which coincides perfectly with core concepts 
in pragmatism, is that reality is far more complex than any one absolute 
conceptual model can explain. 
Enter law and economics, where the habit of over-generalizing plays 
out in different garb. While corporate criminal responsibility has inspired 
excellent scholarship in law and economics, much of it fails adequately to 
tailor pure theory to the realities of globalized markets. As Jennifer Arlen 
explains, the tendency among commentators is to “present the classic 
economic analysis of corporate liability for crime, focusing on optimal 
individual and corporate liability in a ‘perfect world’48 But what of the 
                                                 
45 See, for instance, the discussion of the Continental Oil Company, a company aptly 
dubbed “ROGES”, and Mining and Steel Works East Inc. (BHO) in STEWART, supra 
note 12 paras. 41, 42 and 105; For a more complete history, see J. A. Bush, The 
Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in International Criminal Law: What 
Nuremberg Really Said, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1094 (2009). 
46 The employees of the company were tried and convicted for instigating and inciting 
genocide. See Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment; 
Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment. 
47 See supra note 22. 
48 Jennifer Arlen, Economic Analysis of Corporate Criminal Liability: Theory and 
Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW, 144-203 
(Alon Harel and Keith Hylton, eds., 2012). 
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deeply flawed one we populate? Jennifer Arlen’s work is very good at 
offering altered iterations based on real-world contingencies, but this 
approach must be extended still further, such that a pragmatic attitude 
becomes the norm rather than the exception. If we view the problem of 
corporate offending as a global phenomenon and purge ourselves of our 
understandable proclivity to view law through a very “local” lens, leading 
economic theory suddenly fails to explain many iterations of the subject in 
its extremity. 
Take the gravity of international crimes like genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes. If the utility of criminal law is at least 
partially dependent upon the social meaning of a crime’s stigma,49 it 
stands to reason that the utility of corporate criminal responsibility is not 
constant across different crimes. The extreme character of international 
offenses is helpful in exposing the point: corporations will probably react 
differently to being convicted of a war crime than an everyday domestic 
offense. In fact, popular associations with international crimes might be so 
intense that companies are over-deterred from operating in volatile 
political climates, creating a counterproductive economic trap for nation-
states struggling to avoid or emerge from episodes of mass violence. And 
yet, these intricacies do not feature in the justifications for corporate 
criminal liability on offer within law and economics,50 which sometimes 
seem to assume transactions within a single pristine legal system. By 
definition, corporate crimes in war zones fall outside this model. 
Maybe stigmatizing companies is the better rationale for corporate 
criminal liability? The argument goes that “[t]he stigma and sanctions of 
the criminal law promise greater deterrence from corporate misconduct 
and more opportunities for asset recovery, compensation, and mandatory 
corporate reform.”51 In addition, many also speak to the role of criminal 
justice in propagating moral values within a post-modern world that has 
seen the decline of alternative moral systems.52 To bring things back to 
international criminal justice, prosecuting corporations involved in the 
                                                 
49 For an excellent articulation of this point, including in the context of corporate criminal 
liability, see Dan M Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 609 (1998). 
50 In fairness, Jennifer Arlen’s work does helpfully distinguish between the implications 
of fraud convictions, as compared with environmental harm. My thesis is merely that 
these types of distinction should feature more centrally in corporate theory, since 
corporate liability for international crimes will exponentially magnified the discrepancy. 
Arlen, supra note 48 at 9. 
51 CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY: EMERGENCE, CONVERGENCE, AND RISK 9, 4–5 
(Mark Pieth & Radha Ivory eds., 2011). 
52 See, e.g., Cristina de Maglie, Societas Delinquere Potest? The Italian Solution, in 
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY: EMERGENCE, CONVERGENCE, AND RISK 9, supra note 
51, at 255–270, 268–269. 
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sale of weapons or the pillage of natural resources from war zones can 
transmit values across a global market in a singly unique manner. Given 
the ubiquity of these corporate crimes and the market’s spectacular 
success in insulating itself from the sharp end of all other forms of 
accountability, might corporate convictions for international crimes not 
harness stigma to good effect? 
Sometimes, however, corporate criminal liability may be too blunt 
an instrument. An alternative strategy geared towards acculturation rather 
than stigmatization may prove more successful in changing endemic 
commercial practices, depending on the prevailing circumstances. In the 
sister field of international human rights, Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks 
have pointed to the potential superiority of strategies that employ 
acculturation to promote compliance, beyond those that are coercive or 
persuasive in character.53 So, if acculturation is likely to be more effective 
as a tool for restraining corporate excess in any given situation, sharper 
punishments could actually run counter to the expressive purpose many 
view as a key justification for corporate criminal liability.54 We should, 
therefore, recoil from the proposition that corporate criminal liability is 
always preferrable or even useful as a communicative device, in favour of 
a theory that responds to realities on the ground in a more dynamic 
fashion. That theory is pragmatic. 
B. The Contingencies of Corporate Desert 
 
In the preceding section, we considered a small set of 
consequentialist arguments for corporate criminal liability. The classic 
response is simple—they leave out guilt. In his famous reconciliation of 
the general theoretical purpose of criminal law as a system as a whole and 
the principles to be employed in attributing blame in concrete cases, HLA 
Hart pointed out that even if your rationale for punishment within a 
criminal system generally is deterrence, it is clearly morally vulgar to 
punish family members of those who carried out criminal offenses, even if 
doing so has massive deterrent effects.55 By analogy, the use of criminal 
law as mechanism of regulatory control over corporations in the sale of 
weapons to warring African countries, say, is only defensible if the 
corporation is first culpable of some established crime. And here, many 
                                                 
53 Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and 
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004) See in particular, the table at 
page 699 summarizing these arguments in the context of implementation.  
54 Id. at 687–699. 
55 Id. at 5-6. 
2012] A PRAGMATIC CRITIQUE OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL THEORY 17 
   
argue, corporate criminal liability fails to comply with first principles of 
criminal responsibility. 
Consider some of the effects of shoehorning corporations into a 
criminal structure built for individuals: a corporation has no mind and 
therefore cannot experience guilt; it has no body so cannot therefore act in 
a sense that is not entirely derivative; punishing it would violate the 
fundamental principle that punishment must be imposed only on the actual 
offender; and the usual penalties envisaged within the criminal law are 
frustrated where the nature of the convicted party precludes 
incarceration.56 For many commentators, forcing a square peg into a round 
hole like this is not only unfair to the corporation called to answer within a 
criminal trial, it does violence to the discipline that is obliged to 
accommodate the poor fit. If we are interested to construct a coherent, 
holistic account of criminal justice, instead of treating corporations as a 
category apart, these concerns are worrisome. 57 Might it be, then, that the 
discussions about the utility of corporate criminal liability miss this 
broader picture, and the foundations upon which criminal justice rests? 
Many would say no. Indeed, there is much excellent work refuting 
each of these propositions, but in some instances it too overstates the 
generality of a principle that may not obtain in concrete circumstances. 
Corporate guilt is a case in point. At one level, the fact that we frequently 
blame corporations is a popular rejoinder to those who argue that 
corporations cannot be guilty. As Samuel Buell argues, we hold BP 
responsible for massive damage caused by a faulty oil drill in the Gulf of 
Mexico, or experience moral shock that a weapons manufacturer would 
sell weapons to Hutu extremists at the zenith of the Rwanda Genocide, 
which demonstrates that corporations also populate our moral universe. 
He opines that, “[i]t is a fact of contemporary life that our conception of 
responsibility includes beliefs about institutional responsibility.”58 These 
sorts of practice-oriented explanations for moral agency elevate 
corporations to a position alongside individuals as deserving of criminal 
blame based on common moral intuitions. 
                                                 
56 L. H. LEIGH, THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS IN ENGLISH LAW 1509 
(1969). 
57 In response to this concern, Ana-Maria Pascal argues that corporations cannot have a 
moral conscience, but that instead of rejecting corporate criminal liability on that basis, 
we should formulate an entirely different conception of crime and responsibility based on 
“socio-legal circumstances.” Ana-Maria Pascal, A Legal Person’s Conscience: 
Philosophical Underpinnings of Corporate Criminal Liability, in EUROPEAN 
DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 33–52, 49-50 (2011). 
58Samuel W Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 
491 (2006) (discussing the social practice of blaming institutions for crime). 
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Of course, intuitions might be valuable in developing stereotypes, 
but they are often wrong in specific contexts. So instead of crafting 
corporate criminal liability from common public sentiment, we are 
compelled to imagine an ontological basis for liability that reflects the 
corporation’s own blameworthiness. Christian List and Philip Pettit offer a 
profound justification for blaming corporations along these lines,59 and for 
once, it comes replete with a range of qualifications that, perhaps 
unbeknownst to its authors, render the account somewhat pragmatic. They 
start by identifying conditions for agency, which include: the ability to 
make a normatively significant choice; judgmental capacity, in the sense 
of understanding what is at stake and having the ability to access 
evidence; and relevant control to choose between the options.60 Having 
posited these as necessary and sufficient conditions for agent 
responsibility, they hold that many group agents such as corporations can 
satisfy these requirements,61 but they also carve out circumstances where 
these standards are not met.62 All this means that the best conceptual 
justifications are sensitive to the type of corporation on trial, as 
pragmatism would implore.  
Having established that some corporations can be blamed, a number 
of difficult practical questions arise. Where, for instance, do we look to 
prove a corporation’s culpability? For Pamela Bucy, corporate culpability 
is to be located in a “corporate ethos,” which is identified through 
inspecting the role of the board in monitoring compliance, corporate goals, 
emphasis on educating employees about legal requirements, compensation 
incentives and the like.63 Models of this sort seek to capture “genuine 
corporate culpability,”64 instead of depending on the double-derivative 
character of corporate liability in complicity cases (where an employee is 
derivatively liable for use of weapons by an African warlord, and the 
company becomes derivatively liable through the employee).65 The 
corporation is an entity capable of deserving punishment in its own right, 
quite apart from the actions of its individual representatives. To find the 
                                                 
59 CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, AND 
STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS 153–167 (2011). 
60 Id. at 155. 
61 Id. at 158-63. 
62 Id. at 159, 162-3. 
63 Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 75 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 1095, 1138 (1991). 
64 William S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY LAW JOURNAL 647, 
664 (1994) (discussing four models of corporate culpability that he considers capture 
genuine corporate culpability). 
65 James G. Stewart, The End of “Modes of Liability” for International Crimes, 25 
LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 165, 188–190 (2012). 
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corporate culture that is the blameworthy source of responsibility, we 
simply look to corporate practices that reflect the organization’s identity. 
Admittedly, this idea of corporate culture is hotly contested, but the 
pragmatist acknowledges the circumstances where the proposition is true. 
For John Braithwaite and Brent Fisse, for instance, we should not dwell on 
our inability to see corporate culture in physical form—both individuals 
and corporations are an amalgam of observable and abstract 
characteristics.66 Moreover, corporations and their representatives are not 
one and the same; they have symbiotic relations to one another. The Navy 
is constituted by the actions of individual sailors, but so too the existence 
of the sailor is constituted by the existence of the Navy.67 Thus, 
corporations have their own separate ontology, which cannot be reduced 
to individual agency without turning a blind eye to the formative influence 
of the overarching organization and the unique role this can play in 
bringing about harm.  
Once again, however, one wonders whether this thesis can hold true 
across all corporations. A behemoth bureaucracy like the Navy, for 
example, that deliberately attempts to shape individual behavior of 
members, is not necessarily the same as the relatively minute corporate 
structures that instigate the pillage of natural resources in modern conflict 
zones. Earlier, we discussed the use of “juniors” in the illegal exploitation 
of conflict minerals, precisely because they are closely held shells that are 
easily discarded to avoid detection. It is not clear to what extent there is 
any real symbiosis between individual and corporation within these 
entities, whether “juniors” have any identifiable culture, or where we are 
to draw the line in isolating these phenomena as companies increase in 
size and sophistication. Braithwaite and Fisse’s otherwise outstanding 
explanation only speaks to a certain type of corporate reality, and 
therefore offers a justification that is dependent on contingencies that only 
pragmatism can accommodate.  
The next set of arguments suffers from similar deficiencies. What of 
the retort that corporate criminal liability punishes innocent individuals, 
which forms a key part of the conceptual backlash against corporate 
criminal liability? A significant portion of the literature regrets the 
                                                 
66 Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: 
Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability, 11 SYDNEY LAW REVIEW 468, 476 
(1988) (“The notion that individuals are real, observable, flesh and blood, while 
corporations are legal fictions, is false. Plainly, many features of corporations are 
observable (their assets, factories, decision-making procedures), while many features of 
individuals are not (e.g., personality, intention, unconscious mind)).” 
67 Id. at 477–478. Braithwaite and Fisse also make a beautiful parallel to a reduction of 
language to words without syntax, vernacular, irony and other elements of 
communication. 
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“reputational rub-off” effect of corporate criminal liability on senior 
managers,68 and more frequently, the fact that the costs of a corporate 
conviction tend to be borne by employees and shareholders who are 
presumptively innocent. If Arthur Andersen’s conviction for obstructing 
justice in the Enron fiasco ultimately cost 80,000 people their jobs,69 
would convicting a major diamond producer for pillaging blood diamonds 
from warring African states not amount to an instantaneous corporate 
death sentence, which would ultimately punish innocent company 
affiliates indiscriminately and in great disproportion to the atrocities the 
company had enabled?  
Already, adding atrocities to this hypothetical changes the terms of 
the usual debate, showing the weakness of these arguments as a ground 
for abolishing corporate criminal liability across the board. Sometimes, 
the harm averted clearly outweighs that incidentally visited upon 
shareholders and employees, but surely not always. In any event, the 
double standards that lurk just beneath the surface are difficult to swallow. 
The sudden concern for indirect victims of corporate criminal liability sits 
uncomfortably with the almost total lack of empathy for the plight of 
family, children and community members when a person is invited to 
serve time. On a broader level, capitalism postulates that the brutality of 
forcing 80,000 people onto the streets to find new work is justifiable—
nay, desirable—when market forces dictate that their employer is no 
longer economically competitive, but the same effects that flow from 
market reactions to their employer’s moral turpitude are denounced as an 
aberration.  
But we need not decide the issue definitively in the abstract. It may 
be that in weighing the strengths and weaknesses of a corporate 
prosecution, the perceived benefit of proceeding against a corporation is 
superseded by the immediate negative ramifications to individuals. While 
the slogan “too big to fail” is politically distasteful, it should alert us to the 
fact that the incidental implications of corporate failure are not constant 
across all corporations or contained within national borders. By attempting 
to find categorical positions on issues that simultaneously address the 
family carpet company in India and Goldman Sachs on Wall Street, we 
risk advocating for absolute standards that have potentially tremendous 
ramifications when applied without sensitivity to context. Without 
excusing big banks, it is possible to offer a pragmatic middle ground that 
                                                 
68 V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve? 109 
HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1477, 1510 (arguing that reputational rub-off on corporate 
managers risks increasing the total penalty to exceed optimal damages). 
69 LAWRENCE M. SALINGER, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WHITE-COLLAR & CORPORATE 
CRIME 574 (2005). 
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moves beyond black-and-white arguments whose rigidity will prove harsh 
if applied blindly in all conceivable scenarios.  
 
III. CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY VERSUS CORPORATE CIVIL 
LIABILITY 
 
The second set of arguments that influence the identity of corporate 
criminal liability relates to the relationship between corporate criminal 
liability and civil remedies. Might corporate criminal liability be specious 
given the availability of civil redress, which explicitly attaches to the 
corporation without upsetting basic premises in the criminal law? While 
this section deals with a range of arguments for and against this 
proposition, it bears recalling at the outset that the common law model of 
corporate criminal liability developed because it provided “a more 
effective response to problems created by corporate business activities 
than did existing private remedies.”70 The same pragmatic rationale will 
likely necessitate corporate criminal responsibility for international 
crimes, although much depends on the specificities of individual cases. In 
many instances, both sides of the debate overlook this nuance. 
A. Qualifying the Categorical Preferences for Civil Liability 
 
Let us begin with the argument, already troubling to the 
pragmatist, that civil claims are per se superior to corporate criminal 
liability. According to Vikramaditya Khanna, civil liability can better 
capture the desirable effects of corporate criminal liability, without 
emulating several sub-optimal downsides. Surveying the history of 
corporate criminal responsibility within the United States, Khanna opines 
that the criminal angle appeared to be “the only available option”71 that 
met the need for public enforcement and corporate liability at the time of 
its development, given the absence of widespread public civil enforcement 
prior to the turn of the 20th century.72 Thus, Khanna and I agree that the 
                                                 
70 Richard A. Epstein, Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Trial: Lessons from the Law 
of Unconstitutional Conditions, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL 
LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 38, 45–46 (2011). To be fair, Epstein also 
criticizes corporate criminal liability on the basis that it involves an unjustifiable 
anthropomorphism that ultimately punishes shareholders and employees 
disproportionately.  
71 Khanna, supra note 68, at 1486. 
72 Id. at 1486. 
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concept developed pragmatically to fill a perceived regulatory gap. We 
disagree, however, that the gap is now filled; if one accepts that 
corporations are operating transnationally, including in regulatory 
vacuums created by war and social turmoil, corporate criminal liability is 
still “the only available option” in many instances. 
Professor Khanna offers other arguments that also seem too 
sweeping in breadth. For instance, he argues that reputational loss is not 
effective against certain corporations, since activities that harm third 
parties, such as environmental pollution, do not directly affect a firm’s 
customers.73 Here again, Khanna’s reasoning is not adequately calibrated 
to the moral magnitude of certain systems of criminal law and the 
historical associations that, for better or worse, accompany them. Take the 
diamond industry. The tremendous success of the media campaign against 
furs that brought that industry to its knees more or less directly led to the 
Kimberley Process for monitoring conflict diamonds. Perhaps convicting 
a major diamond producer of war crimes last visited upon businessmen 
who sustained the Nazi apparatus could stimulate a comparable moral 
avalanche, even though the harm at issue is to African civilians in survival 
economies, not to consumers. 
Thus the extremity of international justice helps reveal a hidden 
truth that cautions against rigid, categorical, or universal preferences of 
this sort. It may well be true that civil liability is preferable in a whole raft 
of instances, including for reasons Khanna so ably elucidates, but the need 
for qualification is unavoidable. In this instance, the sheer heterogeneity of 
crimes for which corporations might be held responsible, which range 
from possession of marijuana to insider trading and genocide, militates 
against conceptual positions that are so definitive.74  The moral weight 
that attaches to each is, quite simply, not constant.75 Therefore, whether 
consumers react in ways that promote accountability and responsibility 
will depend on the moral gravity of the crime, historical associations with 
its perpetration, the surrounding political climate and a host of other 
variables, all of which resist processing in the abstract for every 
conceivable manifestation of the problem. Consequently, pragmatism 
must do much more of the heavy lifting. 
                                                 
73 Id. at 1500. 
74 Celia Wells agrees that “[t]he variety in corporate form, reach and activity requires a 
flexible response both in terms of forms of regulation and in terms of corporate liability 
models.” Celia Wells, Containing Corporate Crime: Civil or Criminal Controls? in 
EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 13, 27 (2011). 
75 Indeed, in some cases, the “crimes” in question may arguably lack moral weight 
entirely. Sanford Kadish identifies certain economic crimes as “morally neutral” and 
argues against the use of criminal liability in such cases.  Kadish, supra note 37, at 442. 
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Later, Khanna prefers civil liability because cash fines are optimal 
as long as the corporation is not judgment-proof.76 Given the viability of 
cash claims against the corporation, he concludes that corporate criminal 
liability only detracts from the greater efficacy of civil sanctions.77 But 
there is one problem with this explanation, which cases from the frontiers 
of international criminal justice again help unveil. Judgment-proof 
corporations are likely a relatively finite class within a single functional 
North American legal system, where access to justice is comparatively 
trouble-free, but this cannot be said for victims of transnational corporate 
crimes from the Global South, who are likely to have little to no access to 
the civil liability mechanisms we take for granted. A Syrian father of a 
child killed in a rocket attack cannot easily sue Russian arms vendors for 
contentedly furnishing the perpetrators with weapons used for the atrocity. 
So once the single perfect jurisdiction fallacy is withdrawn, it leaves a 
sense that the exception is actually the norm. 
The essential point, though, is that criminal liability might 
occasionally fill accountability gaps like this where civil liability falls 
short. To draw a vague parallel, US prosecutors recently indicted the 
British weapons giant BAE Systems for violating the US Arms Export 
Control Act and making false statements concerning its compliance with 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act78 when the company’s tremendous 
political power in Britain effectively rendered it judgment-proof there for 
allegedly paying billion-dollar kick-backs to the Saudi government over a 
lucrative weapons deal.79 The parallel with complicity and the Syrian 
hypothetical is loose but meaningful—criminal and civil liability may 
overlap to some extent, but any congruence is far from perfect, and the 
portion of the set outside the intersection creates opportunities for 
prosecutors that have no equivalent elsewhere. As a result, prosecutors 
may find themselves jumping through hoops that are more numerous and 
demanding in order to make cases in corporate criminal liability, even 
though alternative strategies might be preferable if the case were a 
uniquely domestic affair.  
Issues of procedure can have a similar effect. In what he describes 
as “a pragmatic reassessment” of corporate criminal responsibility,80 John 
Coffee references two salient examples of procedural factors that might 
                                                 
76 Khanna, supra note 68, at 1504. 
77 Id. at 1534. 
78 For a helpful summary, see Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 
97 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 1775, 1842 (2011). 
79 For a full and harrowing account, see Section III: Business as Usual, in FEINSTEIN, 
supra note 16. 
80John C. Coffee, Jr, No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick: An Unscandalized Inquiry into 
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favor criminal rather than civil liability. The first involves the relative 
celerity of the criminal trial compared to civil litigation: “because criminal 
cases are typically concluded in a much shorter timespan than civil cases, 
the criminal law potentially can serve as an engine by which to expedite 
restitution to victims.”81 In the context of corporate responsibility for 
international crimes, this could be very attractive, even determinative. One 
of the only successful civil cases brought against corporations under the 
aegis of the Alien Tort Claims Act took 14 years in the pre-trial phase 
alone before Shell gallantly fell on its own sword over allegations of 
complicity in Nigeria.82 If justice delayed is justice denied, this delay may 
constitute a basis for prioritizing criminal cases over other civil 
alternatives, even if this choice comes with greater epistemic burdens for 
litigants.  
Moreover, the criminal angle is attractive since the state brings 
charges and absorbs associated costs. Needless to say, this might override 
all other conceptual preferences, providing further incentives to pursue 
corporate criminal liability over routes that may well be absolutely 
optimal within the single perfect jurisdiction.83 Take a seemingly banal 
comparative issue like the availability of contingency fees: the idea that 
attorneys can take cases in exchange for a percentage of any eventual 
award resulting from litigation they undertake on a client’s behalf. In the 
United States, these arrangements are by and large condoned, but “[t]he 
situation outside the United States is different in virtually every regard.”84 
The vast majority of foreign jurisdictions prohibit contingency fees 
categorically.85 But saddled with the burden of paying their own way in 
private suits against powerful corporations in first-world jurisdictions (not 
to mention the risk of having to pay the other side’s costs), victims of 
transnational corporate malfeasance may rightly see corporate criminal 
liability instigated at a foreign state’s behest as their only hope. 
Finally, criminal cases may offer real substantive advantages too. 
In the types of scenarios where corporations participate in international 
crimes, processing these incidents as civil cases would require plaintiffs to 
engage in lengthy litigation dealing with jurisdiction, forum non 
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conveniens, choice of law and, potentially, enforcement of foreign 
judgments. Each of these components erects potential barriers that can and 
do prove insurmountable for would-be litigants of transnational corporate 
crimes. By contrast, extraterritorial jurisdiction exists over international 
crimes most everywhere, allowing prosecutors to bypass these 
impediments in private international law through a more streamlined 
criminal framing. This resort to extraterritorial application of criminal law 
is certainly no panacea,86 but it does second-guess categorical preferences 
for civil liability in a world where access to justice is so acutely under-
developed, to the obvious benefit of corporations.  
B. Over-Generalizing the Utility of Corporate Criminal Liability 
 
The single perfect jurisdiction fallacy also appears on the opposite 
side of the equation. Unlike the abolitionists who view corporate criminal 
responsibility as an unjustifiable mistake that only obscures civil 
remedies,87 the advocates for corporate criminal liability argue for the co-
existence of corporate and civil remedies. This difference in 
argumentative strategy affects the discourse in important ways; while 
critics of corporate criminal responsibility are content to call for its 
abolition, advocates who feel they have justified using criminal law to 
blame corporations then shift focus to articulate the terms of the 
relationship between the two limbs of accountability they view as acting 
in concert. Part I addressed certain core philosophical arguments, leaving 
us to consider the arguments for corporate criminal liability relative to the 
private alternative. The difficulty is that advocates are also often seduced 
by the single perfect jurisdiction fallacy and their adversaries’ tendency to 
over-generalize.  
To begin, note the view that one of corporate criminal liability’s real 
competitive advantages over civil alternatives is the criminal law’s ability 
to transform commercial practices across an entire industry. These 
commercial practices are ubiquitous, requiring the expressive power of 
criminal denunciation. For Brandon Garrett, for instance, “[t]aking strong 
action against a single firm can also impact an industry to the extent that 
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the firm behaved in a manner common to other similarly situated firms.”88 
A possibility like this is enticing to prosecutors of international crimes, 
who face pervasive corporate offending of long historical pedigree (of 
which the arms and extractive industries are exemplars), severe financial 
pressures to get as much “justice” as possible for each dollar spent, and 
expectations that their work will have transformative effects in ending 
culture(s) of impunity that sustain international crimes. In many senses, 
then, these arguments are a natural fit within international criminal justice, 
perhaps explaining why many view corporate criminal liability as the next 
frontier in this trajectory. 
But where does this leave civil liability? To begin, those who view 
civil liability as valuable but singly inadequate sometimes build models to 
explain when one form of liability should prevail over the other, but these 
models do too little to control the numerous variables of corporate 
criminal offending globally. Samuel Buell, for instance, supports the 
continued availability of corporate criminal liability, but argues that it 
should feature as the “sharp point” of a pyramid, which includes all range 
of civil remedies, including those enforced by public administrative 
agencies.89 While I have no doubt that the pyramid has insightful 
implications for a certain class of cases, my fear is that extrapolating it 
across the variegated types of corporate crimes committed globally (even 
by American firms if one wants to limit things thus) assumes a more 
mature system of global accountability than we have. All things being 
equal, the model makes great sense, but many corporations operate in a 
space where opportunities for accountability seldom present in that way. 
Another of the best-known divisions between criminal and civil 
liability draws the line between corporate actions that society wants to 
prohibit outright (which should be criminalized) versus practices it wants 
to price (which should attract civil penalties companies can pass on to 
consumers).90 Regrettably, this dichotomy too translates poorly into the 
new corporate dimensions of international criminal law. Perhaps it 
suggests that the complicity of arms vendors in crimes like genocide 
should be criminalized because reducing human suffering of this order to 
economic terms would be morally outrageous, whereas the illegal 
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exploitation of natural resources should figure within civil actions where 
legal damages can simply ratchet up the cost of laptops, cars and wedding 
rings. And yet, this neat division again presupposes an equality between 
criminal and civil opportunities for accountability, which seldom exists 
outside the single perfect jurisdiction. Once the theory is subjected to the 
international experimentation pragmatists demand, it often leads to no 
accountability at all. 
Similarly, the political influence of particular industries on 
legislatures and law enforcement agencies is not uniform, thereby further 
distorting any notional equality between civil and criminal forms of 
redress. The point is nowhere more true than in the weapons sector. For 
instance, while civil litigation in the United States has had a tremendous 
regulatory effect on the tobacco industry, attempts to emulate that effect 
within the arms industry have achieved very little—cities such as Chicago, 
New York and Philadelphia have almost invariably lost civil suits against 
arms manufacturers.91 If a combination of complicity and corporate 
criminal liability generates better results, it will most likely be because the 
applicable law and procedure interacted more favorably with the 
countervailing constellation of power politics in concrete cases; less 
because some commercial practices cannot be priced. 
What about having corporate criminal liability operate hand in hand 
with corporate civil cases? True, corporate criminal liability can also 
create incentives for other forms of liability, be they civil liability of the 
corporation or criminal responsibility of individuals. In keeping with this 
insight, Harry Ball and Lawrence Friedman argue that corporate criminal 
liability is useful insofar as it allows prosecutors to threaten “the full 
treatment,”92 that is, all heads of accountability for the single crime. The 
idea is that corporate criminal liability acts as a threat for cumulative 
accountability, unless corporations play along with prosecutors’ desires to 
pursue individual representatives of a business, and to a lesser extent, 
modulate systems of corporate governance.93 By and large, this is a 
welcome proposition, but it still assumes a spectrum of different forms of 
accountability, which is frequently unlikely for disaffected communities in 
say Africa, who cannot draw on multiple options and will consider one a 
luxury. From this different perspective, the “full treatment” seems overly 
abstract, when treatment of any sort remains illusive. 
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Admittedly, there are real chances that corporate criminal liability 
will accentuate the likelihood of civil claims. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar 
ably points out as much, when he argues that “some will recognize how 
the presence of overlapping criminal and civil jurisdiction can facilitate 
the imposition of more severe civil penalties.”94 In particular, Cuéllar 
suggests that the acquisition of information from one legal process might 
feed into the other, meaning that the two operating in tandem create 
results a single form of accountability would not have achieved 
independently. At the same time, while one certainly hopes that this type 
of cooperation blossoms for cases involving international crimes at the 
hands of corporate actors, we should not lose sight of the competing 
possibility that one will be used to thwart the other.95 For international 
crimes involving corporations, the latter appears more probable. 
Take the US Alien Tort Claims Act. Over the past several decades, 
the ATCA has emerged as the framework of choice for human rights 
advocates, largely on the back of the same types of pragmatic sentiment 
that fuelled the growth of corporate criminal liability (decades prior in 
Anglo-American systems, but contemporaneously in Europe). Having 
read international human rights into the ATCA and somewhat awkwardly 
borrowed complicity back into civil liability, human rights advocates 
brought civil cases against Yahoo! Inc, Shell, Rio Tinto and a host of 
other corporations for enabling human rights abuses in the four corners of 
the world. But if there is some synergistic effect between civil and 
criminal liability, where are the parallel criminal prosecutions here? There 
are, quite simply, none. Again, this suggests that we should be slow to 
adopt strong prescriptive positions about the relationship between civil 
and criminal liability of corporations, when context yields such 
disappointing outcomes. 
In sum, our attempts to ascertain the relative merit of civil and 
criminal claims against corporations can only be definitive if we exclude 
certain classes of cases, thereby undermining our claim to universalism. 
To a large extent, pragmatism governs preferences for one system over the 
other, which is not to say that no theoretical explanation is relevant. This, 
of course, leaves the field open to the retort that the division between civil 
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and criminal responsibility of corporations is entirely arbitrary,96 but this 
statement too requires qualification. In any event, if we can avoid the 
pragmatism that now seems inevitable in seeking justice for corporate 
offending globally, more stable theories will not emerge by pretending 
that corporations do not operate internationally or that opportunities for 
law enforcement are constantly ideal everywhere. To assume these things 
risks a collapse into what pragmatists call “philosophical escapism,” 
where theory loses touch with the world we live in. In reality, pragmatism 
seems destined to play the driving role in delineating criminal from civil 
forms of corporate accountability for some time to come. 
 
III. INDIVIDUAL VERSUS CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
 
Even if we suppose that corporate criminal liability will prevail 
over philosophical resistance to the ugly process of forcing corporations 
into a system built for individuals and that corporate criminal liability 
emerges triumphant over civil alternatives, we still face the daunting 
intellectual challenge of formulating a defensible philosophical rationale 
for distributing blame between corporations and the personnel that operate 
them. Here, too, the debate has struggled to conceptualize the full 
spectrum of corporate offending to which this philosophy must cater, in 
ways that assume a parochial sense of criminal justice, a world without 
globalization or a utopian system of global justice that remains some 
distance from reality. In this third part, I criticize both sides of the 
literature that disputes the significance of corporate criminal liability as 
compared with the individual criminal responsibility of corporate officers 
as again failing to respond to the core precepts of pragmatism.  
A. Unnecessarily “Local” Preferences for Individual Liability 
 
In a classic criticism of corporate criminal liability, Gerhard Mueller 
denounces the instrumental punishment of the corporation for acts that 
were undoubtedly carried out by individuals within the company. In 
lamenting the pragmatics that gave rise to corporate criminal liability, he 
famously compared the concept to a weed: “[n]obody bred it, nobody 
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cultivated it, nobody planted it. It just grew.”97 His blanket preference for 
individual responsibility focused on a number of factors, but one speaks to 
a wider set of problems in this literature. For Mueller, “[i]t is a poor legal 
system indeed which is unable to differentiate between the law breaker 
and the innocent victim of circumstances so that it must punish both 
alike.”98 But this begins a set of arguments that are premised on a very 
parochial notion of corporate criminal liability, which crowds out other 
understandings of the concept and therefore sheds too little light on 
corporate problems that span the globe. 
Mueller’s inspiration is exclusively American. In the United States, 
corporate criminal liability developed in a highly pragmatic fashion, 
drawing heavily on tort law that eschewed traditional notions of criminal 
blame. As Kathleen Brickey has noted, “the early doctrine through which 
corporations and their managers were held criminally liable developed 
with little or no heed to traditional notions of culpability.”99 The notion of 
respondeat superior epitomized this methodology; it was simply plucked 
out of tort law then deposited in the adjacent criminal field, regardless of 
its incongruence with foundational notions of criminal responsibility. So 
when Mueller objects to the inability of corporate criminal liability to 
differentiate between corporation and individual, he references the fact 
that respondeat superior makes the corporation criminally responsibility 
for acts of all employees,100 creating an objectionable guilt by proxy that 
flies in the face of liberal notions of punishment. 
A number of very distinguished scholars emulate this approach, 
arguing that individual criminal liability is sufficient, at least in part, 
because respondeat superior enables vicarious liability. For example, 
Richard Epstein criticizes corporate criminal liability on the basis that 
“potency is not enough; specificity and overkill matter as well”.101 
Corporate criminal liability may be a very sharp weapon, but it fails to 
calibrate punishment with responsibility, and is therefore harsh as a 
distributive principle. But in preferring individual criminal responsibility 
as a blanket rule (to function in parallel with corporate civil liability), 
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Epstein and others fail to distinguish corporate criminal liability qua 
concept from the vicarious liability model applicable as a matter of extant 
doctrine in the United States. This not only overlooks the extensive 
literature that argues for alternative theoretical models that better capture 
“genuine corporate culpability”102; it is closed to the foreign versions of 
corporate criminal liability that stand ready to apply these alternative 
standards to live cases, including where American corporate interests are 
in question. 
This oversight has no real relevance for cases that fall within a 
single perfect jurisdiction, but the same cannot be said for transnational 
crimes, such as those involving the complicity of arms vendors in 
genocide or the corporate pillage of resources from conflict zones. In these 
sorts of trans-boundary cases, which involve overlapping criminal 
jurisdictions, corporate criminal liability cannot be summarily reduced to a 
single monolithic doctrine. For instance, in the context of allegations that 
a company named Anvil Mining was complicit in a very serious massacre 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), courts in Australia, Canada, 
the DRC and potentially the United States all enjoyed criminal jurisdiction 
over the case, leaving the per se preference for individual criminal 
responsibility blind to divergent potential consequences generated by very 
different understandings of corporate criminal responsibility in each of 
these jurisdictions. Is this an example of “transform[ing] purely immediate 
qualities of local things into generic relationships”?103 
Once again, these different sets of rules must also be seen together 
with procedural disparities between jurisdictions. For instance, in the 
United States, prosecutors have come to use the threat of corporate 
criminal liability as an incentive to ensure that large corporations sacrifice 
their guilty corporate officers for individual prosecutions.104 This highly 
instrumentalist use of corporate criminal liability allows a very broad 
prosecutorial discretion to overcome rules of procedure that inhibit 
prosecutions of corporate officers.105 But importantly, these procedural 
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hurdles do not exist in other jurisdictions.106 As a consequence, theories of 
the optimal relationship between individual and corporate responsibility, 
which take transnational corporate crimes seriously, also require more 
holistic appreciations of surrounding legal norms. Given the complexity 
and heterogeneity of legal systems throughout the world, categorical 
solutions seem almost impossible to ascertain ahead of time. 
Instead of seeking to establish that individual criminal liability is 
immutably preferable, it might be better to isolate when corporate criminal 
liability is not sufficient, i.e., when is individual criminal responsibility 
necessary? At the level of organization theory, this might occur where: (1) 
the financial gain to the corporation exceeds that acquired by the manager, 
making the manager more vulnerable to measures directed at prohibiting 
conduct than the corporation; or (2) where the criminal law is able to 
generate a deterrent effect that exceeds that which will befall a manager 
through internal retaliation within a company for refusing to violate a 
legal norm.107 If a corporate manager is called to purchase blood diamonds 
or other conflict commodities by senior management, the less probable 
chance of individual criminal responsibility for a war crime may seem 
sufficiently unappealing to offset the very likely repercussions from 
higher-ups in the corporate structure. 
Here too, however, one must be wary of the one-size-fits-all 
approach that pervades much of this discourse. In many instances, the 
grounds for preferring individual criminal responsibility will be perfectly 
banal. For instance, when US prosecutors arrested the famed “Merchant of 
Death” Viktor Bout on charges of attempting to sell weapons to the 
Colombia rebel group FARC,108 there was little suggestion that his shell 
company Cess Air would also be tried, even though the corporate website 
unashamedly bragged about much greater sins elsewhere.109 Cess Air had 
no assets, little real contact with US jurisdictions, and no good-will 
capable of being tarnished. To return to the theorists of corporate criminal 
liability, the more controversial focus on criminal responsibility of 
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corporations is often redundant in closely held companies,110 where the 
organization is a mere subterfuge for individual exploits.111 So if 
individual criminal responsibility is a necessity in these situations, it is 
more because all other options are practically foreclosed, and less because 
an individual focus is optimal as a generic policy. Either way, only a 
pragmatic theory of corporate criminal responsibility will be supple 
enough to mold itself around these variants. 
B. Rationales for Corporate Criminal Liability Are Only Sometimes 
True Internationally 
 
How do the arguments that corporate criminal liability is necessary 
over and above individual accountability fare in the migration from 
domestic theory into international criminal law? In Part I, I discussed a 
host of more general consequentialist rationale for corporate criminal 
liability, but I saved several that deal with the added value of corporate 
criminal liability over individual responsibility for discussion here. These 
arguments are myriad, and often expressed in categorical language that 
may or may not make sense in specific contexts. As things transpire, many 
of these justifications ring true for international crimes at the hands of 
corporations within both the extractive and armament sectors, but as the 
pragmatists warn, this is not a universalizable truth that can be 
automatically transplanted from the local to the international. Once again, 
pragmatism is necessary to differentiate aspects of abstract, local, 
universalized corporate criminal theory that are relevant from those that 
are overly-general when viewed in context. 
A classic argument for corporate criminal liability is that the 
corporation is better positioned to detect, prevent and remedy crimes 
perpetrated by corporate agents than the state. In an excellent series of 
articles, Jennifer Arlen points out the superior incentives generated by 
holding corporations responsible for policing their own employees, saving 
law enforcement agencies the great inefficiency of monitoring from 
without.112 International crimes, perpetrated by participants in the 
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weapons sector for example, corroborate this position most intensely. If 
we hypothesize a case involving the complicity of corporate agents selling 
weapons to Angolan warlords, as was the case with the famed Merchant 
of Death Viktor Bout, then the company is infinitely better situated to 
detect behaviors that satisfy the constitutive elements of the crime than 
law enforcement agencies some distance from the scene. In good 
pragmatic tradition, Arlen’s theory is vindicated by experimental testing at 
the coalface. 
 After the end of the Cold War, Viktor Bout trafficked guns to the 
most brutal conflicts in the world with reckless abandon.113 At one point 
during the Angolan war, for instance a UN Panel of Experts cited Bout as 
selling weapons to both sides of a brutal conflict that had spanned four 
decades, killing at least 500,000 civilians.114 For Bout, this was just the tip 
of the iceberg in a notorious career that spanned the most troubled regions 
of the globe. When he was finally brought to justice in the United States 
for attempting to sell weapons (apparently to be used to shoot down 
American civilian planes) to FARC in Colombia,115 proof of the charges 
underscored Arlen’s point about placing the corporation, not state, at the 
forefront of internal monitoring. Incredibly, the evidence used in the trial 
of one of the most talked about arms vendors in the world, alleged to have 
sold weapons to those responsible for atrocities in the Congo, Sierra 
Leone, Iraq, Afghanistan and beyond, stemmed from a single sting 
operation carried out by FBI in Thailand.  
If the trial based on this one fabricated commercial transaction 
grossly understated Bout’s true responsibility, it helped highlight basic 
evidentiary problems. Whether perceived or real, the evidential constraints 
for law enforcement agencies in cases like this are undoubtedly greater 
than for implicated corporations. Stepping back from the specific example 
of Bout to consider investigative hurdles prosecutors will face in bringing 
charges against corporations for international crimes, the challenges might 
seem daunting: access to crime sites for representatives of foreign law 
enforcement agencies in, by definition, the most insecure reaches of the 
planet; an ability to secure forensic evidence that ties corporations (say 
weapons vendors) to international offenses (say massacres); the cost of 
bringing witnesses half way across the world to testify in foreign trials, 
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difficulties with mutual legal assistance and extradition from Third World 
states; and important cultural differences in the way events are 
experienced, then communicated.  
To some extent, global justice must inevitably grapple with all 
these difficulties regardless, but structuring corporate criminal liability in 
such a way that companies bear much of this burden seems both efficient 
and prudent. Given the scale of the problem, the inadequacy of traditional 
responses and the direct access corporations enjoy to information about 
their employees, it makes sense to demand that they police transactions by 
individual employees that may lead to massacres or involve the illegal 
exploitation of conflict commodities. And yet, at the same time, we should 
again guard against the tendency to see this explanation as a panacea—
Bout’s company fully supported his nefarious project and was no more 
capable of monitoring or restraining the man than Western powers, the 
United Nations, human rights advocates or Hollywood.116 So constructing 
corporate criminal liability to incentivize internal discipline makes sense 
in many, but not all, instances. 
What of the problem of fungible corporate employees? When there 
is sufficient pressure from within a corporation (or market) to violate legal 
proscriptions, individual criminal responsibility offers weak deterrent 
value, since corporations will find some employee willing to undertake 
their criminal enterprise. As I have argued elsewhere, this problematic 
represents the leitmotif for all international crimes—very few atrocities 
are so dependent on the acts of any one individual that we can say with 
confidence that they would certainly not have transpired absent any one 
accused’s individual agency.117 Most atrocities depend on a collective 
apparatus, usually a state, military group, political party or criminal 
organization, meaning that international criminal justice has some 
considerable experience struggling with that thankless task of isolating 
individual responsibility from within collective structures. Perhaps it 
offers lessons to corporate criminal theory? 
Consider the responsibility of individual board members of 
companies that enabled apartheid in South Africa. In addressing the 
painful history of Western commercial influence on apartheid, the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission concluded that ‘[c]ertain 
businesses were involved in helping to design and implement apartheid 
policies. Other businesses benefited from cooperating with the security 
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structures of the former state.’118 Many of these actions constituted 
complicity in or direct perpetration of crimes, but allocating responsibility 
to individual board members raises complex normative problems—if a 
company’s board passed a motion to assist apartheid crimes by a bare 
minimum (i.e., 8 votes to 7 in a board composed of 15 members) then 
each board member who cast an affirmative vote did make a difference to 
the downstream consequences, but in any other voting configuration, the 
company would have acted as it did regardless of any individual vote. 
In response to these problems, many of the best scholars in 
international criminal justice call for collective responsibility. As George 
Fletcher has argued, “the liberal bias toward individual criminal 
responsibility obscures basic truths about the crimes that now constitute 
the core of international criminal law. [They] are deeds that by their very 
nature are committed by groups and typically against individuals as 
members of groups.”119 To return to the argument in corporate criminal 
theory, a turn towards the collective entity may not only allow us to 
bypass these cumbersome problems in blaming corporate officers, it may 
also generate a degree of deterrence for collective entities that is hard to 
bring home to individuals, who know full well that someone else will 
perpetrate the crime even if they personally defect. And yet, we are 
reminded of the contingencies that will affect the legitimacy of this course 
in concrete cases. 
 This brings us to one of the most often cited justifications for 
corporate criminal liability. For very many criminal theorists, corporate 
criminal liability can act as a kind of “convenient surrogate” that at least 
achieves some accountability when “we cannot identify the real 
[individual] decision-maker.”120 This thesis has wide currency politically 
too—in calling on all European states to promulgate corporate criminal 
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law within their criminal codes, the European Union openly pointed to 
“the difficulty, due to the often complex management structure in an 
enterprise, of identifying the individuals responsible for the commission of 
an offence.”121 In simplistic terms, corporate criminal liability is essential 
in order to prevent the corporate veil from acting as a protective cloak that 
defeats normal forms of criminal accountability.122 Once again, this 
important insight is unlikely to be anywhere near a categorical truth. 
Trawling through evidence that supports just some of these 
international cases, it quickly becomes clear that the present stage of 
development is prior to even the earliest phases of corporate criminal 
liability domestically. We live in a world where there is perfect impunity 
for international crimes perpetrated by corporate actors and their agents, 
broken momentarily after WWII and in one or two sporadic instances in 
the past decade. Understandably, businesses and their employees have 
become utterly complacent. To cite one example, the chairman of one 
important multinational described company conduct in a warring African 
state in the 1980s in terms that may well amount to a more or less 
verbatim confession to the war crime of pillage—and this in the 
company’s annual report. If evidence against prominent corporate 
individuals is hard to come by in many domestic contexts, the same is not 
self-evident internationally.  
This insight again underscores why we should hesitate to take even 
the most erudite theoretical explanations for corporate criminal liability as 
gospel truth for every manifestation of the phenomenon they describe, 
since some received wisdoms are incompatible with the realities of 
specific corporate crimes. Instead, the task may be to develop a much 
more sophisticated set of factors that are relevant in seeking justice for 
corporate wrongdoing, and to identify many of the variables we have 
taken for granted until now. At the level of responsibility, however, there 
may be ground for viewing the company and its employees as co-
perpetrators of international crimes. If one regards the corporation as a 
repository of a particular ethos that can support the allocation of criminal 
blame, the argument that this corporate ethos is frequently complicit in the 
individual officer’s crime is compelling.123 As always, however, the 
pragmatists’ reminder that so much depends on context is a helpful check 
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on our desire for all-encompassing theories, which always miss the mark 
somewhere in the real world.  
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION: A PROBLEM MORE COMPLEX 
 
This article has presented a criticism of the literature addressing the 
identity of corporate criminal liability, offering reflections from the far 
peripheries of the subject. To be clear, much of the theory of corporate 
criminal liability is highly illuminating in plotting factors for 
consideration, even if it frequently arrives at conclusions that do not 
square with all variations of the phenomena they describe. This arises 
because much of the literature has adopted parochial concepts of corporate 
criminal law, categorical positions that are not sensitive to the 
complexities of reality, and philosophical positions that downplay the 
intensity of transnational commercial ventures as part of an increasingly 
globalized marketplace. If cases from international criminal justice help 
expose this reality, they may have some role in generating new holistic 
theories that better account for the problem of corporate misconduct in its 
full sense. These theories must move from absolute overstatement to 
reveal more of the hidden variables, understand the applicable laws as best 
possible, and develop conceptual factors that favor one path over the next 
on a provisional not fixed basis. Until we inhabit a more orderly global 
society where opportunities for corporate accountability are drastically 
improved, a pragmatic theory of this sort is inescapable. 
